Inspired by philosophical phenomenology, clinical phenomenology allows us to take into consideration the construction of psychopathology’s theoretical discourse based on clinical contact. In this article, we aim to explore the contributions of Merleau-Ponty and Tatossian for the establishment of a clinical phenomenology of one’s body. The article is structured in three strands: 1) the relation of implication, rather than of application, between philosophical and clinical phenomenology; 2) Merleau-Ponty’s one’s own body notion; 3) the idea of the body I am versus the body I have in Tatossian’s clinical phenomenology, which will bring out an understanding of the lived body in depression. Through the one’s own body notion, clinical phenomenology is more likely to produce an important contribution to the development of treatments and interventions that understand the body in an ambiguous way as a subject and object, as touching and touched at the same time; the body I can only be as long as I have it.
Keywords: Clinical phenomenology; One’s own body; Merleau-Ponty; Tatossian; Depression.
Drug addiction undermines intentional consciousness. Whereas in normal consciousness we have a fluid intentionality and our common sense is the obviously pre-reflexive result of this situation, under the influence of a drug intoxication we lose this intentional stability and, as a consequence, suffer from a kind of intentional instability, which we can refer to with the term floating world. This floating world is characterized by splitting, vibration and a multiplication of images which can be both sequential or overlapping. On the other hand, following chronic drug assumption, we have a sort of an intentional dramatic capture or seizure of the world, which we can call frozen world. Lived time, space, the body and other existential parameters differ enormously in these two contrasting ways of being. The crisis of the temporal-spatial vortex eventually and inevitably leads to the blow of the void (le coup de vide): the experience of unreality or no self-experience. The total collapse of the world is the common final result of the breaking down of the temporal and spatial structure of Dasein.
Keywords: Life-world; Addiction; Consciousness; Intentionality; Lived time; Lived space.
This paper aims to analyze the addiction to Internet as one of the possible responses to deep boredom characteristic of the current man, unable to constitute an authentic project and to provide sense to an empty world. The addict wanders the surface, in a changeable world where the anonymity and the auto-designed profiles allow fleeing from the facts of one’s biography. In effect, while the user is connected, the oppressions of his story disappear and the future develops into a search of the effulgent instant of new things. In complex cases, the existence thrown towards a volatile present becomes strange to all past and to all future, shaping a cycle of repetition, relapse and detention of personal development. Jump from a stimulant content to the following one, crossing infinity of worlds and realities with the execution of a click, in a compulsive movement to experience the fleeting pleasure that is offered by the interesting, a progressive confinement in an empty present.
Keywords: Phenomenological Psychopathology; Addiction; Internet; Boredom; Temporality.
The aim of this study is to achieve divergences and convergences of two perspectives in psychopathology: psychopathology as scientific discipline and phenomenological psychopathology. Through a literature revision, we intend to clarify that the way each one that perspectives understands the conscious supports all development of its thesis in psychopathology to develop a theme, we take in to considerations the studies of two perspectives about obsessive-compulsive disorders. While psychopathology as scientific discipline understands the conscience as substantially and is based on symptomatology to make conclusive diagnostics; phenomenological psychopathology understands conscience in its space-time flow and is based on space end time experience. We conclude that the psychopathology as scientific discipline and phenomenological psychopathology although that differ in the way they understand the conscience; they have in common the disregard of the historical horizon of structure. We believe that this study to take contributions to development theories and practices of psychopathology.
Keywords: Psychopathology; Science disciplinary, Phenomenology; Obsessive-compulsive disorders; Conscience
This paper aims to show that what is referred to as delusional perception in schizophrenia is an experience which artists of genius have themselves experienced and portrayed in their work. The author’s conclusion is that both conditions schizophrenia and artistic genius are unworldly states in which the essence of something is perceived in its most paradigmatic form.
Keywords: Schizophrenia; Art; Cezanne; Rilke; Rodin.